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CASE COMMENT: SUSAN DOE V.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
ACCESS TO ASSISTED CONCEPTION: A
CALL FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM IN
LIGHT OF THE MODERN FAMILY
Lisa Feldstein
Abstract: This paper explores the impact of laws regarding
assisted conception and the discriminatory effect these laws
have in light of non-traditional family forms. Specifically, it
considers the Processing and Distribution of Semen for
Assisted Conception Regulations and how these regulations
serve to exclude certain individuals who do not fit into the
“traditional” nuclear family model. The author critiques the
judgement of Susan Doe v. Attorney General of Canada and
calls for legislative reform in order for the laws to accurately
reflect realities of the family in the 21st century.

Lisa Feldstein wrote this paper during her second year at Osgoode
Hall Law School. She is currently an articling student at Dykeman
Dewhirst O’Brien LLP. She would like to thank Professor Mossman,
her family law professor, for providing feedback on this paper.
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INTRODUCTION
The family has always been an integral part of society, and for
many individuals, procreation is the goal and purpose of human
existence. It is, therefore, disconcerting to couples when natural
conception proves to be an ineffective means of having
children. In modern society, there is a plethora of options to
help couples experiencing difficulty achieving a pregnancy.
However, treatments are not equally available to all members
of society. Financial restraints aside, individuals outside of the
mainstream are often unable to access assisted conception due
to reasons grounded in discrimination and prejudice.1 A
relatively recent case, Susan Doe v. Attorney General of
Canada,2 illustrates how sperm donor regulations in Ontario
serve to exclude individuals based upon age and sexual
orientation.
The judgments in Susan Doe reflect some of the biases
and prejudices underlying Canadian law and policy. This case
provides a basis for a critique of how discriminatory beliefs
continue to infiltrate Canadian society despite the existence of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.3 In this case
comment, I will first discuss the need for legal reform in light
of changing family compositions and the shift away from the
traditional family. I will then provide a brief overview of the
facts, issues, and litigants in the Susan Doe case.
Once the groundwork is laid, I will analyze the
discrimination that arises in the judgments, drawing on the
1

The discrimination in this case is both explicit and implicit, grounded
in the legislation, the judicial decision, and social norms.

2

Susan Doe v. Canada (Attorney General) (2007), 84 O.R. (3d) 81.

3

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act 1982, being schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.
11.
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underlying themes of individual and family autonomy and
equality. In particular, I will consider the discriminatory
treatment, in both the case and the relevant regulations, of the
following: men over the age of 40, men who have had sex with
another man, lesbian women, and women unable or unwilling
to conceive via sexual intercourse with a man. I conclude, first,
that there is an absence of relevant and modern legal principles
that accurately reflect the reality of assisted reproduction and,
second, that there is a significant need to reform Canadian
sperm donor legislation in order to eliminate discrimination,
and to better respect equality and autonomy.
THE CHANGING FAMILY
& THE UNCHANGING LAW
Families have undergone a transformation throughout the 20th
century; consequently, traditional families are no longer the
norm.4 There is an increase of working mothers, lone-parent
families, and children born outside of marriage; there is also
the increasing acceptance by Canadian society of these
changes.5 In addition, courts have slowly begun, in certain
cases, to allow for a more functionalist approach that
recognizes non-traditional family units that function as a
family. In a 1993 dissent, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé recognized
the changing nature of families and the need to focus on
underlying values.6 Over the past fifteen years, some majority
4

Mary Jane Mossman, Families and the Law in Canada (Toronto:
Emond Montgomery Publications Limited, 2004) at 1.

5

Supra note 4 at17. There is some evidence that queer families are on
the rise; however, the counting of same-sex couples began only in
2006 and therefore trends are more difficult to identify. See Statistics
Canada, 2006 Census: Family portrait: Continuity and change in
Canadian families and households in 2006: National portrait: Census
families (Census) (Ottawa: Demography Divsion, 2007) at 12.

6

Canada (Attorney General) v. Mossop, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554.
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judgments have come to accept and respect the preference for
alternative family arrangements. An additional example of
functionalism may be found in some legislation, such as the
Children’s Law Reform Act, which assumes males in particular
circumstances to be the father of a child, unless proven
otherwise.7
The gradual acceptance of different family forms is by
no means an indication that legal frameworks have kept up
with the times. Specifically, legislation has not yet been
amended to adopt new legal principles that have been
established in the common law. For example, thus far, issues
regarding assisted conception have been resolved on a case-bycase basis, but have not yet stimulated the Parliament to clarify
the existing laws.8 The case critiqued in this comment
highlights the need for legislative reform in light of the
changing family norms.
Change is difficult to implement, as many policy
makers have traditional beliefs and ideas about the ways
families live, but “these ideas are not always representative of
the broad range of lifestyles prevalent in modern society”.9
Therefore, a mere call for legislative reform is not sufficient
because such reform may take the approach of reinstating the
traditional nuclear family rather than creating laws capable of
conforming to the changing context of families. As a
foundation for new legislation, there must first be an
understanding of the needs and interests of alternative families,
which may then be used to guide legislators in making
amendments.
In addition, there must be a greater
understanding of underlying themes such as autonomy and
equality that permeate so many legal issues in family law.
7

Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-12, s. 8.

8

Supra note 4 at 190.

9

Ibid. at 17.
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Susan Doe highlights the need for more research to be
performed on alternative families and for the modification of
the sperm donor exclusion criteria in a way that conforms with
the changing needs of the modern family.10
In Susan Doe, two particular features of the changing
family are most relevant: (1) that childbirth is often postponed,
and (2) that childbirth is no longer limited to heterosexual
couples. 11 As postponed childbirth and same-sex marriages
become increasingly common, the sperm donor exclusions in
Canada simultaneously become increasingly problematic.12 It is
noteworthy that one of the guiding principles in the federal
Assisted Human Reproduction Act (“AHRA”) is that “persons
who seek to undergo assisted reproduction procedures must not
be discriminated against, including on the basis of their sexual
orientation or marital status”. 13 However, in the case of Susan
Doe both of these grounds, among others, were infringed.14

10

Only the Parliament has the power to change the Processing and
Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception Regulations, which
incorporates the exclusion criteria by reference to the Directive in
which they are found.

11

In a 2006 Census, Statistics Canada found that 16.2% of same-sex
married spouses had children and that the number of same-sex
couples grew dramatically in the previous five years. As well, the
Census found that there were more never-married lone parents than in
previous years. See Statistics Canada, 2006 Census: Family portrait:
Continuity and change in Canadian families and households in 2006:
National portrait: Census families (Census) (Ottawa: Demography
Divsion, 2007) at 12-13.

12

Based on the fact that children are more common in married same-sex
relationships rather than unmarried same-sex relationships, and the
fairly recent legalization of same-sex marriage, I suspect there will be
a growing interest in assisted conception in the future.

13

Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2, s. 2. Although the
AHRA is not paramount to the sperm donor regulations, it is relevant
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BRIEF OVERVIEW OF SUSAN DOE
In the 2007 case of Susan Doe v. Attorney General of Canada,
a woman sought access to assisted conception. Due to the fact
that she is in a lesbian relationship, she and her partner decided
to use the sperm of a male friend, who had previously assisted
with the conception of their other daughter. However, they
immediately faced challenges, as the Processing and
Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception Regulations, 15
which fall under the federal Food and Drugs Act,16 do not
allow men over the age of 40, or men who have had sex with
another man, to donate their sperm to the general, national
sperm donor program – to known or unknown recipients - due
to health reasons. The donor in this case fell into both
categories. There is one avenue to circumvent this regulation:
men who are excluded, depending on the reason, may apply to
the Minister of Health for special permission to donate to a
known woman. This process, however, involves rigorous
screening and takes several months longer to process than a
normal donation. It also involves greater expense than the
process for recipients using semen from a spouse or sexual
partner and excludes the possibility of using fresh semen,
“which is more effective for conception”. 17

for comparative purposes because it is legislation on a related topic
for which the Minister of Health is also responsible.
14

Sexual orientation was recognized as an analogous ground in a trilogy
of equality rights cases beginning in 1995. See Egan v. Canada,
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, Vriend v. Alberta,[1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, and M.
v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3.

15

Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception
Regulations, S.O.R. 96-254.

16

Food and Drug Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27.

17

Susan Doe v. Attorney General of Canada; The Foundation for Equal
Families et al., Intervenor, (2006) 79 O.R. (3d) 586 at 51.
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The appellant would likely have taken the special
access path had the donor agreed. However, he did not feel
comfortable having his semen stored for a long period of time
in a sperm bank due to concerns that it would be used to
impregnate someone other than the appellant. The appellant
therefore looked to the Regulations to find of way of avoiding
going down the special access path.
The appellant took issue with the definition of
“assisted conception”, claiming it violated her s. 7 and s. 15
Charter rights. The definition of assisted conception in the
Regulations is stated as, “a reproductive technique performed
on a woman for the purpose of conception, using semen from a
donor who is not her spouse or sexual partner”. It was argued
that this definition is problematic because lesbians “by
definition cannot be inseminated by a spouse or sexual
partner”. The court ultimately concluded that because this rule
also applies to heterosexual women using a donor who is not a
spouse or sexual partner, it is not discriminatory due to
underlying reasons of sexual orientation. Both the Ontario
Superior Court of Justice and the Ontario Court of Appeal held
that the appellant’s Charter rights were not infringed. The
donor acted as an intervener in the case, arguing that the
exclusion criteria infringed his s. 15 rights as well. His
arguments were heard only to the extent that they advanced the
appellant’s claim, and were therefore not expressed and
analyzed to the fullest extent possible. The arguments brought
forward by the litigants have some merit, but are overall quite
weak. 18 Despite the weakness of some of the appellant’s
18

In terms of her s. 7 Charter argument, the appellant claimed that she
suffered psychological harm because the special access program
required a longer waiting period. In both the author and the court’s
opinion, this is a weak argument because it is not a deprivation of her
right to security of the person. The Court of Appeal characterized the
appellant’s reported psychological harm as “better ... described as
frustration”.
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arguments, I respectfully disagree with the Court’s decision
and argue that it ought to have found for the interveners under
s. 15 of the Charter as the effect of the Regulations is
discriminatory toward the donor. However, the Court stated
that it was unable to decide on this matter due to the scope of
the intervener’s status and the relief sought. In the alternative,
the Court ought to have taken advantage of the opportunity this
case presented to call for Parliamentary action to remedy the
discriminatory effect of the Regulations.
At the present time it does not appear that the appellant
is seeking leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.
THE EXCLUSION OF MEN OVER 40 FROM THE
GENERAL ASSISTED CONCEPTION PROGRAM IS
DISCRIMINATORY AND INFRINGES ON WOMEN’S
AUTONOMY TO CHOOSE A KNOWN DONOR IN THIS
CATEGORY
Age discrimination, though an enumerated ground, is more
difficult to establish than other forms of discrimination, largely
because age is not a fixed category. 19 Throughout life, an
individual has opportunity to both take advantage of and be
excluded from various experiences. It is hardly a legal concern
that fourteen year olds in Ontario are not permitted to drive or
that senior citizens may not purchase children’s tickets when
going to the theatre. However, in Susan Doe the age
discrimination is alarming because the rule is not applied to
those over 40 years of age in a universal manner.

19

Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms states
that, “[e]very individual is equal before and under the law and has the
right to the equal protection of the law without discrimination and, in
particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability”.
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The Court of Appeal held that it is not discriminatory
that men over 40 are excluded from donating their sperm to
anonymous recipients or known donors who are not spouses or
sexual partners in the general donor program. 20 It reasoned
that, firstly, the policy is based on serious health concerns, and
secondly, that in light of the Donor Semen Special Access
Program (“DSSAP”), available since 2000, men over 40 are
entitled to donate their sperm to known recipients who are not
sexual partners and are therefore not actually excluded. It was
stated by Justice MacPherson in the Court of Appeal judgment
that:
[t]here is a clear correspondence between the
ground of age and the nature of the differential
treatment. As noted by Dr. Francesca Agbanyo,
a senior scientist at Health Canada, men in this
age group are subject to an increased risk of
spontaneous genetic mutations. The over 40
exclusion protects unborn children from this
risk. 21
The donor and Egale Canada Inc., another intervener,
argued that the DSSAP is an additional, lengthier step that
younger men need not take and this therefore amounts to
differential treatment. The court did not agree with the
interveners as the exclusions are no longer absolute. I am
inclined to agree with the interveners and I take issue with the
fact that no such screening is required of couples capable of
natural conception or women using the semen of a sexual
partner or spouse. Health Canada specifies that, “semen
belonging to a spouse or a sexual partner of the recipient is not
subject to any of the requirements outlined in the Semen

20

Supra note 2.

21

Supra note 2, at para. 42.
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Regulations”. 22 Therefore, a man is legally entitled to have a
child with his spouse at 70 years of age if he so chooses and
there is no statutory bar to this event. Why is it then that when
one needs technological assistance older men who are not
sexual partners or spouses are suddenly subject to these rules?
As mentioned in the case and quoted above, health is a primary
concern. But would it not be acceptable to explain this to a
woman seeking assisted conception and take her consent as
acceptance of the risk? Surely a woman who has the mental
capacity to make her own decisions about pregnancy and health
care, is deserving of such consideration. Failing to give such
consideration undermines the woman’s autonomy to make
decisions about her body, and the autonomy of her family, in
this case, Susan Doe and her long-term partner’s autonomy to
create a sibling biologically related to their existing child. The
failure of the court to rectify this problem calls into question
how much autonomy is really granted to individuals and
families in these circumstances, particularly women seeking
pregnancy from someone other than a heterosexual spouse or
partner.
THE EXCLUSION OF QUEER MEN FROM THE
GENERAL ASSISTED CONCEPTION PROGRAM IS
DISCRIMINATORY AND PATERNALISTIC TOWARDS
WOMEN
Queer men, 23 unlike heterosexual men, may not donate their
sperm unless they have applied to the Minister of Health for a
“special access authorization” and are donating only to a

22

Canada Business, Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted
Conception (Ottawa: Health Canada, 2007), online: http://www.
canadabusiness.ca/servlet/ContentServer?pagename= CBSC_FE/dis
play&c=Regs&cid=1081944204151&lang=en.

23

“Queer” is an all-encompassing term and includes men who have had
sex with another man, but do not necessarily identify as gay.
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consenting known recipient.24 However, it was held in Susan
Doe that this differential treatment is not discriminatory. The
underlying rationale for the exception is health policy,
specifically, that “medical evidence … establishes that there is
a higher prevalence of HIV and Hepatitis among men in the
MSM category”. Granted, men in the MSM category may be
more likely than heterosexual men to have sexually transmitted
infections, but this is not to say that all men in this category are
infected. To exclude all queer men from donating their sperm
on this basis is bizarre, particularly if the donation is provided
for an informed and consenting close friend.
The court appears to confuse the issue by claiming,
“the differential treatment is not discriminatory and does not
promote the view that gay men are less worthy of being
parents”.25 The real issue in the case regards discrimination in
the context of donating sperm, not parenting, and indeed
discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation, despite the
court’s allegation that it does not. How could it not
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation when the policy
specifically excludes men who have had sex with men? It is
absurd to think that a healthy man, who had sex with a male
once in his life, in the late 1970s, is not entitled to donate his
sperm to a consenting long-term friend in the 21st century. Also
concerning is the chilling effect on the formation of
homosexual families if the application process appears too
burdensome, embarrassing, or offensive. 26
24

Health Canada, Health Canada Directive: Technical Requirements
for Therapeutic Donor Insemination (Directive) (Ottawa: Blood and
Tissues Divsion, 2000) at 2, online: <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhpmps/brgtherap/applic-demande/guides/semen-sperme-acces/semensperme_directive-eng.php#2>.

25

Supra note 2, at para. 43.

26

Angela Cameron, “Regulating the Queer Family: The Assisted
Human Reproduction Act” (2008) 24 Can. J. Fam. L. 101 – 121.
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Drawing on the theoretical perspective of familialism,
in which ideologies are modelled on “traditional” family
values, the reasoning behind the MSM exclusion policy
appears outdated and offensive. Familialism is an approach
that, according to Katherine O’Donovan, “opens up questions
about how idealized families (often patriarchal and
heterosexual) are deeply embedded within social and legal
policies”. 27Drawing on this “family values” framework, it
appears as though the reasoning behind the exclusion of queer
men (and men over 40 years of age) is paternalistic, rooted in
the traditional practice of men making important decisions on
behalf of women. The appellant argues that only women
“whose donors are their spouse or sexual partner … are entitled
to knowingly and voluntarily accept the risks to themselves and
to their unborn children associated with conceiving a child with
the donor of their choice”. 28The appellant contrasts this with
lesbian women who, as a result of their sexual orientation, do
not have a partner capable of producing sperm. What are some
possible explanations for this policy, beyond the stated health
concerns underlying the regulations? How can one justify
infringing individual autonomy in such a way? The Court of
Appeal clearly acknowledges that the scheme is “not primarily
concerned with personal autonomy… but rather with health”. 29
I question whether physical health concerns of such a
protectionist and paternalistic nature should triumph the
principles of equality and autonomy in cases where one
consents to the health risks.
It appears as though legislators grant greater autonomy
to women with male partners. One possible reason for this
discriminatory treatment, raised through the familialism lens, is
that policy-makers may have thought women were not capable
27

Supra note 4, at para. 28.

28

Supra note 2, at para. 28.

29

Ibid. at para. 29.
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of making decisions relating to families. This line of thinking
fails to recognize both the autonomy and equality of women in
society. Lesbian couples are by nature a female unit without a
male head of house to make decisions. Single heterosexual
women also lack a male partner and are perhaps thought of as
less capable. Perhaps these underlying beliefs, which refuse to
recognize a family as a unit without a male figure, have yet to
be eradicated from the sperm donor legislation. It is possible
that they reflect thinking from a different time, when lesbians
were not able to marry and single mothers were uncommon and
stigmatized. The Court should have identified this blatant
discrimination and paternalism, and used this case as an
opportunity to speak out against these injustices.

THE REGULATIONS ARE DISCRIMINATORY
TOWARDS LESBIANS, SINGLE HETEROSEXUAL
WOMEN, AND TO ALL WOMEN SEEKING
ASSISTED CONCEPTION
The appellant claimed that the Regulations allow only women
whose donors are their sexual partners to voluntarily accept the
associated risks; this includes both risks to self and risks to the
unborn child. The argument is extended to point out that since
heterosexual women may use known donors, lesbian women
should be entitled to do so as well. As clarified by the courts,
heterosexual women using a donor who is not a sexual partner
are also not entitled to voluntarily accept the associated risks.
However, the mere fact that a judge recognizes this similarity
does not suggest that the policy is necessarily correct. While
the discrimination is not strictly based on sexual orientation, it
is based on whether or not a woman is in a sexual relationship
with a man. This policy serves to exclude both lesbian couples
and single heterosexual women, and this exclusion is not
justified. The problem arises not because the policy is based on
health and safety, or even allegedly on sexual orientation, but
because the policy fails to recognize and balance other
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important considerations. Two of the neglected considerations
are the principles of autonomy and equality. 30
This case begs the question: why can mothers not
choose to assume the risk for themselves and their child? After
all, mothers who are capable of conceiving naturally may do so
with men over 40 or men who have had sexual intercourse with
another man. In addition, throughout the pregnancy, and even
post-pregnancy, mothers determine the nature and weight of
their child’s interests. Only women who cannot or choose not
to conceive naturally are subject to legal principles that
regulate the source of the sperm. The court attempts to
reconcile this argument by pointing out that all sperm must go
through some level of testing, but this fails to acknowledge the
fact that there is no such testing in natural conceptions.
It is particularly interesting that a reigning principle of
family law, “the best interests of the child”, is upheld only for
women using sperm from someone who is not their sexual
partner. The application judge specified the purpose of the
Regulations as protecting the “health of women undergoing
assisted conception, to reduce the risk to women and their
partners of acquiring transmissible infectious diseases and to
reduce the risk to their unborn children of acquiring
30

Equality was in fact discussed in the case as the appellant raised a s.
15 Charter argument in regard to her and the donor. Both claims
failed. However, I believe that the analysis only failed to find
discrimination toward Susan Doe because the appellant selected the
incorrect comparator group. Rather than comparing lesbians to
heterosexual women, the comparison should have been, as the judge
acknowledged, to “women seeking insemination with the semen of
their spouse or sexual partner.” In addition, the equality argument
regarding the intervener was dismissed due primarily to
administrative reasons. The application and appeal court judges failed
to acknowledge the important issues brought before them by the
inventors and to take advantage of the opportunity to make much
needed advances in the common law and human rights movement.
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transmissible infectious diseases and suffering birth defects”.31
While it is partially true that a woman “seeking assisted
conception with the semen of her spouse or sexual partner …
has already been exposed to any risk”, this reasoning applies
only to the MSM exclusion, and does not imply that the unborn
child faces no risk at all.32 For example, a woman faces no risk
to her own health if her sexual partner is over 40, but her
unborn child faces an increased risk of spontaneous genetic
mutations. The risks are identical for unborn children whether
or not the donor is a sexual partner of the mother; however,
only where the donor is not a sexual partner does the age serve
as a sufficient reason to exclude. Why is it that the interests of
the child do not seem to matter in these cases? Both women
conceiving “naturally” and women using a known donor who is
a sexual partner are exempt from the application of this
principle. This differentiation violates the principle of equality,
confuses the importance of the best interests of the child, and
points to an inconsistency that ought to be remedied.

CONCLUSION
Patricia Baird has suggested, and I could not agree more, that
“[w]ell thought out social policy goals are needed” in the area
of reproductive technologies, and that “the law needs to be
amended in the attainment of these goals”.33 The 21st century
family and the role of parents within the family unit are
increasingly complex. Viewing families through a familial lens
fails to appreciate the diversity of situations and the integrity of
the family unit. It is time to start viewing the family through a
post-modern lens, which views small accounts of the world and
accepts that more than one true, or correct, path is available. 34
31

Supra, note 2. at para. 20.

32

Ibid. at para. 21.

33

Supra note 4 at 190.

34

Ibid.
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In Susan Doe’s situation, where her male donor is a close
friend and the father of her daughter, it may perhaps be more
useful to take account of the specifics of the case, rather than
treat it as a generic lesbian couple accessing assisted
conception in the hopes of having a child.
One way to accommodate situations such as the one
found in Susan Doe is to modify the Health Canada directive
entitled Technical Requirements for Therapeutic Donor
Insemination.35 The Exclusion Criteria found in this directive
could be amended so that known donors who are queer or over
40 years of age – provided they do not fall into any of the other
excluded categories – are treated virtually the same as spouses
and sexual partners who wish to donate semen.36 This would
require high risk individuals, such as persons who have been
exposed to known HIV infected blood, to donate through the
special access program. It would also ensure that recipients of
anonymous donors’ semen are not exposed unknowingly to the
risks of semen from queer men and men over 40 years of age.
Such a scheme would demonstrate greater respect for the
autonomy of lesbian couples, single women, and heterosexual
couples unable to conceive and wishing to use a known donor.
It would also have the effect of treating these groups more
equally in comparison with women using a known donor who
is a sexual partner or spouse. In addition, I suspect that most
known donors and their recipients would take steps to ensure
that the donor undergoes independent testing prior to donating
semen.

35

Supra note 24.

36

While requiring these donors to fall outside all the other exclusionary
criteria treats persons using assisted conception differently than
persons using natural conception (e.g. a person with active viral
hepatitis may conceive naturally but would be excluded under the
Regulations), it is still of utmost importance to uphold the integrity of
the Regulations and maintain health as a fundamental concern.
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Although the justices in Susan Doe failed to recognize
the absence of legal principles that account for modern families
and assisted reproduction technologies, perhaps the
government will appreciate the significance of the important
issues this case raises, and begin to better address the need for
equality and autonomy in the assisted conception legislation.

